What might be right about the causal theory of time by Sklar, Lawrence
L A W R E N C E  S K L A R  
W H A T  M I G H T  BE R I G H T  A B O U T  
T H E  C A U S A L  T H E O R Y  OF T I M E  
A causal theory of time, or, more properly, a causal theory of spacetime 
topology, might merely be the claim that according to some scientific 
theory (the true theory? our best confirmed theory to date?) some causal 
relationship among events is, as a matter of law or merely as a matter of 
physically contingent fact, coextensive with some relationship defined by 
the concepts of the topology of the spacetime. A strongest version of such 
a causal theory would be one which demonstrated such a coextensiveness 
between some causally definable notion and some concept of topology 
(such as 'open set') sufficient to fully define all other topological notions. 
Given such a result, one would have demonstrated that for each topologi- 
cal aspect of the spacetime, a causal relationship among events could be 
found such that that causal relationship held when and only when the 
appropriate topological relationship held. 
I believe, however, that the aim of those philosophers who have 
espoused causal theories of spacetime topology has been grander than 
this. There is a general and familiar philosophical program that works like 
this: In some given area of discourse it is alleged that our total epistemic 
access to the features of the world described in this discourse is exhausted 
by access to a set of entities, properties and relations characterized by an 
apparently proper subset of this conceptual scheme. Then, it is alleged, 
the full content of propositions framed in this discourse must be charac- 
terizable in terms of its totality of observational content, this content 
being describable in the distinguished concepts of the subset of epistemi- 
cally basic concepts. So, the program continues, it is up to us to show how 
all the empirical consequences of the theory really are framable in the 
distinguished concepts alone. In so far as the theories framed in the 
totality of concepts appear to make empirical claims outrunning those 
expressible in the basic concepts, these must be shown to be ultimately 
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reducible to the empirical content expressible in the basic concepts. And 
if the assertions of the total theory go beyond those reducible in content 
to assertions of the distinguished vocabulary, then they must be shown to 
be true merely as a matter of choice or 'convention'. 
I believe that, explicitly ~r implicitly, some such program underlies all 
those various causal theories of spacetime topology with which we are 
familiar. So interpreted the philosophical theory is not just the explica- 
tion of the results of some scientific theorizing, but an attempt at an 
epistemological and semantic critique which displays initial constraints 
into which any satisfactory scientific theory must fit. For if the epistemic 
and semantic analysis proposed by the philosophical theory is correct, 
then the limits of meaningful assertiveness of the scientific theories are 
delimited, the distinction between fact asserting and 'mere convention 
making' elements in the scientific theories is drawn, and the criteria are 
made clear under which we are entitled to say whether or not two 
allegedly alternative total theories are or are not properly speaking 
'equivalent' to one another and, in Reichenbach's terms, whether they 
differ merely in descriptive simplicity or in some genuine empirical 
content. 
Taking our total theory to be one which describes the spatiotemporal 
topological structure on events and that portion of the causal relation- 
ships among them which contains reference only to which events are and 
are not causally connectible with one another, a causal theory of 
spacetime topology is a philosophical theory whichalleges that the total 
empirical content of this overall theory is exhausted by its causal part; and 
that any spatiotemporal topological assertion can be reduced to an 
assertion about causal relatability supplemented, perhaps, by conven- 
tional choices of 'ways of speaking'. 
But, I believe, we must proceed with some caution here. What counts 
as 'the full causal structure on events', and, hence, what counts as the 
allowable empirical basis to which all our theoretical elements are to be 
reduced may not be the same in all 'causal' theories of spacetime 
topology. And two philosophical theories even while agreeing as to the 
nature of the 'epistemic basis', may, as we shall see, disagree as to why the 
elements in question are allowed into the reduction base. 
What I wish to suggest here is that, for rather well known reasons, some 
choices of an epistemological basis in causal theories of spacetime 
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topology won't  do the job intended for them. I think that one suggested 
basis does have some plausibility. But its plausibility, I will suggest, rests 
on grounds which might lead us to think that the designation 'causal' is 
inappropriate for this philosophical reductionist account of spacetime 
topology. 
While our ultimate grounds for accepting or rejecting such a 
'philosophical' theory of spacetime topology will be 'philosophical' or, 
more particularly, in terms of an epistemological critique of spacetime 
theories, it is important and enlightening to see just how particular 
scientific theories of spacetime fare in the light of one's philpsophical 
account. I will try to show how several recent results in the mathematical 
foundations of general relativity 'fit in' with the analysis of implausible 
and more plausible 'causal' theories of topology which I will survey. 
Finally, while I believe that the 'causal' theory I end up with is a more 
plausible candidate for a possibly successful reductionist account of 
spacetime topology, I do not believe that it itself is uncontrovertibly 
correct. I will note some reasons for being cautious about accepting it as a 
philosophical account of spacetime epistemology and semantics. 
I I  
Let us consider first the version of the theory which takes as its 'reduction 
basis' the relation of causal connectibility among events. As usual, we 
note, the 'definitions' of the topological notions in terms of the causal are 
in the mode of possibility. Some topological relationship is alleged to hold 
if some appropriate causal relationship could hold. That topological 
notions reduce to causal only if we allow causal notions 'in the mode of 
possibility' is a familiar feature of such philosophical reductionism. I will 
forego rehearsing the well-known reasons for the necessity of the invoca- 
tion of such possibility talk and the equally familiar reasons for alleging 
that such an invocation vitiates at least part of the reductionist program. 
In the version we are now exploring the notion of two events being 
causally connectible, i.e. its being possible for one to be causally related to 
the other, is taken as our primitive notion. In terms of it we attempt to 
construct an adequate defining basis for the full gamut of spatiotemporal 
topological notions. NOt surprisingly we do not need to invoke any notion 
of the direction of time at this point, and causal connectibility, rather than 
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the asymmetric relationship of 'a could be a cause of b' will be sufficient. 1 
How plausible is such a causal theory of topology? 
There are, I believe, two basic grounds on which a philosophical 
reductionist thesis is usually challenged: 
(1) First it might be claimed that in order to have grounds for believing 
that a relationship utilized in the reduction basis holds, we must first have 
some knowledge of relationships holding which are in the portion of the 
theory to be reduced or defined away. If this is so, it is claimed, then the 
reduction basis is not a properly epistemically primitive basis. 
(2) Second it can be argued that the reduction basis is not adequate to 
provide 'definitions' for all the concepts of the total theory. That is, even if 
we can, without knowing any of the defined relationships to hold, 
establish which relationships in the reduction basis do in fact hold, that 
information will not be adequate to fully determine all the relationships 
which are expressed in the total theory. 
Our first version of a causal theory of spacetime topology has been 
challenged on both these grounds. 
First, can we really tell which events are causally connectible without 
already knowing a great deal about their spatiotemporal relationships to 
one another? In our usual accounts of the notion of causality we find that 
while causality means falling under a natural law, and a law is a general 
rule connecting kinds of events, knowing which particular events are 
causally related to which other particular events requires knowing a great 
deal about the spatiotemporal relations of these events to one another. 
Strikings of matches cause lightings of matches, but to tell that this 
striking caused that lighting we must know that this particular striking 
bears to that particular lighting an appropriate spatiotemporal relation- 
ship. Now while I believe that there is some truth to this objection, I think 
that a possibly viable 'causal' theory of topology is lurking under this first 
theory despite this initial objection. But rather than pursue the matter 
here, I will save this discussion for later. 2 
Second, can we really define all our topological notions in terms of the 
notion of causal connectibility? Here is where some results of the 
mathematical study of spacetimes become crucial. If the philosophical 
reductionist theory is correct, it is claimed, then in any possible spacetime 
we envision the topological notions must be connected to the appropriate 
causal notions in the way specified by the reductionist account. For the 
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topological notions are supposed to be defined by the causal notions. Is 
there a definition of the appropriate basis for all topological notions (say a 
definition of 'open set') in terms of causal connectibility which holds in all 
the spacetimes we take as conceivable? 
Not if we allow ourselves the full range of spacetime compatible with 
general relativity, including those we might view as causally 
'pathological'. 
][n the Minkowski spacetime of special relativity we can indeed causally 
define (in the present meaning of that term) the open set basis sufficient to 
fully define the topology. An explicit definition of the open sets in terms 
of ,causal connectibility is available in terms of the well-known Alexan- 
droff topology for Minkowski spacetime. 
In those general relativistic spacetimes which are strongly-causal it can 
also be shown that the Alexandroff topology and the usual manifold 
topology will coincide. Indeed, the coincidence of the topology defined by 
the causally defined open sets of the Alexandroff topology with the usual 
manifold topology is equivalent to strong causality. When the spacetime 
is not strongly-causal, however, the manifold topology and the Alexan- 
droff topology will fail to coincide) 
Malament has recently shown that in any spacetime which is both past 
and future distinguishing (a weaker condition than strong causality) one 
can at least implicitly define the topology in terms of causal connectibility. 
That is, given any two past and future distinguishing spacetimes, any 
causal isomorphism between them (bijection preserving causal connecti- 
bility) will be a homeomorphism relative to the usual manifold topology. 
He has also shown that this is a strongest possible result in that one can 
construct examples of spacetime in which either past or future disting- 
uishing is violated and such that there will be causal isomorphisms 
between pairs of such spacetimes which fail to be homeomorphisms, If 
the past and future distinguishing condition is not met the topology 
cannot be even implicitly defined in terms of causal connectibility. There 
are, in fact, spacetimes where the failure of causal definition of the 
topology is made particularly manifest. I refer here to those spacetimes 
where the topology is non-trivial but where causal connectibility is a 
relationship which holds between every pair of events. 4 
Now we might try to hold that the kinds of spacetimes in which either 
explicit or implicit definition of the topology by causal connectibility fails 
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are impossible spacetimes. For example, they are, to be sure, infected 
with the kind of pathological causality which we would not ordinarily 
expect to find in a causally 'well behaved'  universe. But if we can even 
understand what such spacetimes would be like, then the fact that we can 
understand them (know what it would be like to live in one of them, for 
example) shows us, I think, that any hopes of establishing that in the 
actual world our actual concepts of topology are defined by notions of 
causal connectibility are unacceptable. Without going into details here, I 
believe that such worlds are perfectly intelligible to us and that with a 
little imagination anyone familiar with the basic concepts of relativistic 
spacetime can be gotten to understand just what the topological aspects 
of such a world would be like to an inhabitant of them. Further, we can 
construct pairs of spacetimes which are causally isomorphic in our present 
sense and which are such that an inhabitant of them can, by topological 
exploration, discover in which of the alternative spacetimes he resides, s 
I I I  
Now the fact that our initial attempt at a causal theory of spacetime 
topology fails in two diametrically opposite directions might lead us to 
believe that the prospects for any such theory are dismal indeed. The 
basis chosen in this original version of the theory is too weak to do the job 
required of it - define the full topological structure in every spacetime we 
wish to take as intelligible. Yet it is so strong, i.e. contains so many 
elements and of such a kind, that it appears that we already need 
epistemic access to much spatiotemporal structure on events in order to 
tell when the relationship which is utilized in the basis, causal connec- 
tibility, holds. But we will see that the situation is not quite as hopeless as 
it looks. 
Let  us try to remedy the defects of our original theory first by moving to 
a stronger basis, holding in abeyance for the moment  the obvious 
difficulties this will give rise to. Within the relativistic context two events 
are causally connectible if there is a continuous causal (timelike or 
lightlike) path between them. This follows from the standard view that 
causal interaction is inevitably mediated by the emission, transmission 
and reception of some 'genidentical' material or lightlike 'particle'. So 
within this context, we know that the relationship of causal connectibility 
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holds of a pair of events if we know the truth of the existential claim that 
there is at least one continuous causal path containing the two events. 
Now suppose we take as our basis notion not causal connectibility but, 
instead, the notion of continuous causal path. We then have full know- 
ledge of the basis relationship not when we know merely which pairs of 
events are connectible by some continuous causal path or other, but when 
we can tell of any set of events whether or not it constitutes a continuous 
causal path. Does the introduction of this much stronger basis change the 
picture significantly? 
That is does follows from an important and interesting result of 
Malament's. Given any two spacetimes (taken to be four-dimensional 
manifolds with pseudo-Riemannian metrics of Lorentzian signature) any 
bijection which takes continuous causal curves into continuous causal 
curves will be a homeomorphism! In other words, the full topology of the 
spacetime will be fixed by its class of continuous causal curves. So if we 
can fully determine the latter, then we can fully specify the former as 
well. 6 
But can we determine the continuous causal curves of a spacetime 
without already being able to determine its topological features? This 
obvious objection to the epistemological use of a result like Malament's 
to establish a causal theory of topology is well known. Let  us first present 
it and then in the next section move on to the deferred task of showing 
why, despite this argument, something which might be called a causal 
theory of topology can have a case made out for it that meets this 
"epistemological' objection. 
In one version, and among philosophers I think the most common one, 
the picture one has is something like this: A single observer wishes to map 
out the topology of the spacetime in which he dwells. Equipping himself 
with an infinite number of material or lightlike.particles, he emits them 
from all points in all directions (we must be generous in such idealiza- 
tions) so determining the structure of continuous causal paths in his 
spacetime. Now, by Malament 's result, he can pin down uniquely the full 
topology of the spacetime, including such not-directly-determined fea- 
tures as which spacelike paths are continuous, etc. 
But how does our observer tell which classes of events in the life history 
of a 'genidentical' particle are spatiotemporally continuous portions of its 
history? Indeed, how does he even tell which events are events in the 
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history of one such particle and not events selected at random from the 
histories of any number of distinct particles? Only, it is alleged, by already 
knowing what the continuous spatiotemporal segments really are, i.e. 
only by already having access to topological features of the spacetime. 7 
I V  
But consider the following version of a 'causal' theory of topology: It is 
true that on the picture just looked at we gain access to the full topology of 
the spacetime only by already knowing part of it, i.e. only by already 
knowing which are the continuous timelike and lightlike curves in it. But 
this is already a 'reductionist' gain. And when we realize the real 
epistemological importance of the basis to which total topological know- 
ledge has been reduced, we see just how important a gain this is. For what 
constitutes the continuous causal paths of the spacetime is just what is 
available to our direct episternic access. Not because we have some 
wonderful way of spotting continuous segments in the history of geniden- 
tical particles without any antecedent knowledge of the topology. That is 
silly, for what we mean by continuous segment in the history of a 
genidentical particle is just a continuous set of spacetime locations along a 
causal path occupied by the same kind of material particle. But, rather, 
because each causal path can be traversed by a local 'consciousness' who 
directly and immediately, as a primitive content of his experience, can tell 
which events in his consciousness, and hence which spacetime locations 
along the worldline of his history, are 'near' one another! 
The idealized picture we have now is of a universe equipped not with 
one observing 'consciousness' but with a plentitude of them, so that the 
totality of causal worldlines of the spacetime is covered by consciousnes- 
ses sensing immediately and directly whichlocations of the spacetime 
along their respective worldlines are 'near', i.e. determining without 
inference or instrument which are the continuous segments of causal 
curves in the spacetime. Extravagant as this seems when put this way, the 
basic idea here has appeared explicitly or implicitly from Robb through 
Hawking and Malament. 8 
So the causal theory of spacetime topology has now been replaced by a 
reductionist account which is not really 'causal' in its fundamental 
epistemic motivation. The reductionist program still takes as the body of 
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concepts to be reduced those characterizing the full topology of the 
spacetime. The reduction basis consists in those concepts relating to 
continuity of the one-dimensional causal worldlines of the spacetime. But 
this set of topological features is not discriminated from the general class 
because the causal worldlines are the paths of propagation of causal 
influence throughout the spacetime but, rather, because such curves, 
being the worldlines of the possible life histories of 'consciousnesses', 
have their continuity open to 'direct epistemic access' without the inter- 
vention of instruments or the necessity of theoretical inference. I will 
shortly return to the question of just how plausible such a reductionist 
program might be. I don't wish here to maintain that this is the correct 
philosophical account of our knowledge of the topology of spacetime and 
of the semantic analysis of topological concepts in general, but only that it 
is the most plausible version of a 'causal' theory of topology, combining, 
as it does, a genuine reduction (from the totality of topological aspects to 
those along causal paths alone) with an at least prima facie case for the 
epistemic priority (in terms of immediacy of access) of the concepts of the 
reduction basis. I also believe that at least some readers will agree with me 
that it is this version of the 'causal' theories which captures the fundamen- 
tal epistemic 'intuitions' which lay behind the other more 'causal' 
causal accounts. 
V 
At this point it is enlightening to introduce some additional results of 
recent mathematical work o n spacetimes. At first glance these new results 
might seem to militate against the version of the causal theory we ended 
up with. But on reflection, I believe, they illustrate, rather, the force of 
our last account of the causal theory. 
Suppose we have available to us a full picture of the topology (con- 
tinuity) of the causal worldlines of the spacetime. Can we then infer 
immediately the full topology of the spacetime ? Malament's result seems 
to show that we can, for any two spacetimes (in the usual 4-manifold with 
Lorentz-signature metric sense) which agree on their causal worldline 
topology will agree in all topological aspects. But it isn't that simple. 
Following the work of Zeeman on novel topologies for Minkowski 
spacetime, recent work has been done on looking for interesting novel 
topologies for the spacetime of general relativistic worlds. These new 
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topologies, unlike the usual manifold topology, 'code' into themselves the 
full causal structure of the spacetime. This is true in the sense that any 
homeomorphism between spacetimes relative to the new topologies are 
automatically conformal isometries. This is not true of homeomorphism 
relative to the usual manifold topologies. With these new topologies the 
spacetimes are not manifolds. 9 
The importance of these new topologies for our present purposes can 
be seen in the manner of their construction. One starts off imagining a 
spacetime equipped with the usual manifold topology. One then seeks a 
new topology which will code the causal structure in the manner 
described above, and which will then, perforce, differ from the usual 
manifold topology. But the new topology is so constructed that it agrees 
with the manifold topology on the topology induced on the one -dimensional 
causal curves. For example, there is the path topology of Hawking, King 
and McCarthy. It is defined as being the finest topology on the spaeetime 
which induces on all continuous causal curves the same topology induced 
on them by the usual manifold topology. 
So, obviously, the standard and the novel topologies will agree on all 
topological facts about the causal curves. Now aren't  we in a position to 
be skeptical about our 'causal theory of topology'? For if we can fully 
exhaust our knowledge about the topology along such causal paths and 
yet still not know the full topology of the spacetime (is it the standard 
manifold topology or is it, instead, one of the novel topologies?) aren't we 
in just the same position which caused us to reject our first version of a 
causal theory of topology? For there we pointed out that in the case of 
spacetimes which were not both past and future distinguishing, two 
manifolds could share their causal structure (there could be a causal 
isomorphism between them) and yet not be topologically identical (i.e. 
not homeomorphic). This led us to say that the structure determined by 
causal connectibility was not sufficient, in general, to fully fix the topology 
of the spacetime. And here, once again, we seem to be saying that once we 
allow for the possibility of the novel topologies, we can no longer fully fix 
the topology of the spacetime even given full topological knowledge of 
the causal paths. 
But the situations are not parallel. The trouble with the causal connec- 
tibility version of the causal theory of topology is this: Two spacetimes 
might be causally isomorphic and yet be empirically distinguishable in 
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their topological structure. They may very well differ in the structure of 
continuity along causal paths which is the paradigm of epistemically 
accessible topological structure. But if two spacetimes share the same 
topological structure along the causal paths, and if this structure exhausts 
the empirically determinable topological structure of spacetime, then no 
empirical observation could tell us which of two incompatible full 
topologies (say standard vs. the path topology of Hawking et al.) is really 
the full topology. 
And what that suggests is this (the familiar end product of the problem 
of theoretical conventionality): If two spacetimes share the same topol- 
ogy induced on the causal paths, then, appearances to the contrary, they 
are really (topologically) the same spacetime. Their real topological 
structure may be expressed in the standard manifold form (and, as 
Malament's theorem shows only one of these will be compatible with the 
topology on the causal paths) or it may be expressed in terms of the path 
topology of Hawking et al., or in terms of any other non-manifold 
topology designed to code the causal structure. But these are merely 
alternative formulations of one and the same set of empirical facts. For (in 
the usual positivist vein) since the topology on the paths exhausts what 
can be empirically discovered about the topology in general, the total 
factual content of the general topology is exhausted by the topological 
structure it induces on the causal paths. 
One awaits at the present time a neat mathematical formulation which 
eschews the necessity for topological assertions about the spacetime 
which appear to outrun the topological facts about causal curves, and 
which captures the empirical equivalence among all topological struc- 
tures which induce the same topology on the causal paths, by offering as 
the full characterization of the topology of the spacetime the mathemati- 
cal description of the continuity structure on causal paths alone. 
VI 
How plausible is a causal theory of spacetime topology, even in its most 
plausible version in which it becomes rather a 'topology of worldlines 
traversable by a consciousness' theory of spacetime topology? Now, of 
course, much of the answer to that question will depend upon just how 
plausible in general one takes philosophical reductionist theses, with their 
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underlying positivist motivations, to be. While many are skeptical (often 
without much in the way of argument above and beyond 'realist' dogmat- 
ism) of reductionism in general, this is hardly the place to rehearse most of 
the familiar issues of whether or not 'pure' observation bases exist, of the 
allowability of modal possibility talk into the reductive definitions, etc. 
Rather let me focus on just a few issues for discussion which come to mind 
when one reflects on this particular attempt at philosophical 
reductionism. 1° 
(1) The theory presupposes that at least one aspect of spacetime 
structure is accessible to consciousness without instrument or inference. 
But is this belief supportable? Here the reader may remember the 
discussion of spatiotemporal coincidence in Reichenbach's Axiomatiza- 
tion of the Theory of Relativity. Here Reichenbach reflects upon the fact 
that while coincidence is taken as a primitive of his (and everyone else's) 
reconstruction of relativity, if this decision to take it as a primitive is based 
upon the ground that we have immediate non-inferential knowledge of 
what events in the physical spatiotemporal world are really coincident we 
are on dangerous ground. Aren' t  the coincidences of which we are 
'immediately' aware subjective coincidences; and isn't it objective coinci- 
dence with which we are concerned in our reconstruction of the theory of 
physical spacetime? 11 
In the present case, by what right do we identify the continuity of inner 
experience of some observer, as subjectively experienced, with the 'real' 
physical continuity of the spacetime locations at which these experiences 
occur? Imagine, for example, a consciousness instantaneously and dis- 
continuously transported through spacetime, so that the continuity of his 
'inner' experiences misrepresents the discontinuity of the spatiotemporal 
locations at which he has them. 
What we have here is just one more example of a well known and 
enormous difficulty for reductionism: If reductionism allows in its basis 
for reconstruction only the content of the immediately experienced, then 
how can it ever give us an adequate account of the nature of the objective, 
physical world? For if we slide down the slippery slope we get on to when 
we once begin to 'reduce' the inferred to the 'immediately experienced', 
how can we ever stop before reaching the bottom where the basis is the 
contents of subjective experience; thereby dropping out of the realm of 
concepts dealing with the physical 'outer' world altogether? 
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(2) The theory presupposes that our only direct epistemic access is to 
the continuity of spacetime locations in the lived one-dimensional history 
of a consciousness traversing a causal worldline. Is this plausible? 
First, relying on something quite reminiscent of Kant's distinction 
between space as the manifold of apperception of outer experience and 
time as the manifold of apperception of both outer and inner experience, 
the theory places our experience of ti~e, and continuity in it, in a very 
special position indeed. All our topological insight into the world is to be 
grounded in an awareness only of the temporal continuity of our experi- 
ence. Our knowledge of the spatial aspects of the world is derivative from 
this temporal sense, and, if what we have said about conventionally 
alternative topologies is correct, really, properly speaking, only conven- 
tional. For the only real topological facts are the facts about temporal 
continuity along causal paths. 
But is this correct? What about our apparent 'direct' knowledge of the 
structure of the space around us? Is this to be dismissed? We could, of 
course, pull the not uncommon move of distinguishing 'perceptual space' 
from 'physical space' and argue that our direct apprehensions are only of 
the former, the latter to be 'constructed' out of our temporal experience. 
But then the peculiar asymmetry of taking most of our perceptual life to 
be 'merely subjective' while allowing our direct experience of temporal 
continuity to serve as immediate access to the external world appears in 
an even more striking light. 
Consider, again, what is, on reflection, the rather surprisingly different 
treatment accorded topological and metrical aspects of spacetime on this 
view. Nearly everyone who writes about the foundations of our know- 
ledge of spacetime takes metric features of the world, even those along 
causal paths (elapsed proper time along a causal worldline) to be founded 
on some physical measuring process. In order to ground our knowledge of 
just how much proper time elapses between two events on a causal path 
we must rely, it is almost invariably alleged, either on clocks or on a 
specification of the affine parameter determined by the paths of freely 
falling particles. If one tries to bring forward our immediate experience of 
the magnitude of duration, this is almost always dismissed as a confusion 
of 'psychological time' with the objective physical magnitude. 
But why should psychological experience of temporal magnitude be 
irrelevant to founding our knowledge of the magnitude of physical 
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duration and yet the psychological experience of temporal continuity be 
taken as giving us immediate access to the real facts about continuity 
along causal paths? 
(3) Next consider Reichenbach's well known claim that the topology 
of spacetime is just as 'conventional' as is its metric. Just as we can save 
alternative metrics in the light of any experience by a sufficiently rich 
flexibility in the postulation of universal forces, so any topological thesis 
can be maintained if we allow ourselves the global flexibility of choosing 
how to identify or dis-identify events (moving from multiply connected 
spaces to their simply connected cove3-ing spaces, for example) and the 
local flexibility of tolerating causal anomalies, i.e. spatiotemporally dis- 
continuous causal interaction mediated by the spatiotemporally discon- 
tinuous motion of genidentical signals. ~2 
But if the continuity of worldlines is determinable directly by con- 
sciousness traversing them, aren't we denied at least the second kind of 
flexibility noted? So aren't at least the local facts about topology non- 
conventional? Here I think that two (obvious) options present them- 
selves: (1) We could accept the non-conventionality of continuity along 
causal worldlines, thereby supporting the intuitions which at least some 
have had that topological facts (or at least some of them) are non- 
conventional in opposition to the full conventionality of the metric; or (2) 
We could remember the possibility, noted above, of consciousnesses 
themselves experiencing as continuous what are actually spatiotempor- 
ally discontinuous histories, and allow for the saving of topologies now by 
contemplation of a sufficiently rich allowance of 'experientially anomal- 
ous' worlds. 
All of this is just one more way of emphasizing the fundamentally 
problematic nature of our best causal theory: the fact that it seems to 
put one kind of experience on our pa r t - the  experience of tem- 
poral continuity-on a pedestal as the o n e  way in which psychological 
experience gives hs 'direct access' to the structure of the objective 
world. 
(4) It is worthwhile to reflect for a moment on the idealized basis of 
'directly knowable facts' to which all assertions are to be reduced in our 
theory of topology. This consists in all facts about the continuity of causal 
path segments, for each such segment could be traversed by a conscious- 
ness able to directly ascertain its topology. 
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But, of course, no one consciousness, even in the most extreme 
idealization, could traverse them all. For example, a consciousness 
which experiences one event is, in principle, excluded from having in its 
experience, ever, the direct awareness of an event at spacelike separation 
from this event. 
Of course it is a standard problem with philosophical reductionisms of 
this kind as to whether the reduction basis should consist in the total 
possible experience of a single observer or the total amalgamated experi- 
ence of all possible observers. In the relativistic context this takes on a 
particularly disturbing aspect. The experiences of some observers simply 
can't be communicated to some other observers. It is easy to cook up 
spacetimes such that one has a pair of them which are distinct in their 
topology and metric structure; whose differences are determinable on the 
basis of the collective experience of all possible observers; but which are 
such that no one observer ceuld ever tell - even if he lived a worldline of 
infinite extent past and future - which of the two spacetimes he lived in. 
These are the so-called indistinguishable spacetimes. 13 
Should a reductionist account of topology allow in its basis of facts 
everything which could be known to all observers taken collectively, or 
should the basis consist, rather, in the possible experience of some one 
observer? The former alternative seems in many ways the more natural, 
for even on radically positivist grounds it seems unfair to exclude as 'real 
facts about the world' something which someone could ascertain in a 
direct non-inferential way. On the other hand, the usual pressures toward 
solipsism encountered in positivist programs may tend to make a suffi- 
ciently radical reductionist reject even the basis to which the causal 
theory reduces topology as allowing too much in, since it takes as factual 
elements of the world which could never, even in the most 'in principle' 
way, be known to any single observer trying to ascertain the topology of 
the world. 
V I I  
Ultimately, deciding on the plausibility of some reductionist account of 
topology of the kind we have been exploring will require resolving some 
of the deepest of philosophical questions: questions relating to the 
existence and nature of an 'observation basis' on which all theorization is 
to be constructed and questions relating to just what extent one can, on 
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the one hand, support a positivist-reductionist account of 'theoretical' 
features of the world and, on the other hand, to what extent one can 
defend a 'realism' which allows for valid inference 'beyond the 
immediately observable'. A theory of theories which does justice both to 
our strongly held intuitions of realism and yet at the same time makes 
coherent sense of the progress of physics in weeding out 'metaphysical' 
elements by means of epistemic critiques and Ockham's Razorish prun- 
ings of theories is not yet before us. But at least I think that we can now 
see that a causal theory of topology is really one more attempt at such an 
epistemological critique of theories. 
I have been maintaining that 'causal' is really a misnomer for such 
theories of topology. To be sure even in our last, most plausible, version 
of a 'causal' theory of topology the 'hard facts' about the topology of the 
world are reduced to facts about the continuity and discontinuity of causal 
paths in the spacetime. But not because they are the paths of 'genidenti- 
cal' causal signals, rather because they are the paths which constitute the 
possible life-histories of experiencing consciousnesses. 
One final query: Is the identity of the causal paths with the worldlines 
of possible consciousnesses just an 'accident', just an artifact, as it were, 
of the relativistic facts about the lawlike nature of the world? Or is this 
identity within the relativistic context instead the inevitable result of any 
physical theory which survives an adequate epistemic critique? If the 
latter is really the situation, rather than the former, then the mis- 
identification of reduetionist topological theories as causal may not be 
merely a mistake, but rather a symptom leading us to further insight. TM 
The University of Michigan 
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